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Abstract
This paper investigates the evolution of strategic play where players drawn
from a finite well-mixed population are offered the opportunity to play in a
public goods game. All players accept the offer. However, due to the pos-
sibility of unforeseen circumstances, each player has a fixed probability of
being unable to participate in the game, unlike similar models which assume
voluntary participation. We first study how prescribed stochastic opting-out
affects cooperation in finite populations. Moreover, in the model, cooperation
is favored by natural selection over both neutral drift and defection if return
on investment exceeds a threshold value defined solely by the population size,
game size, and a player’s probability of opting-out. Ultimately, increasing
the probability that each player is unable to fulfill her promise of partici-
pating in the public goods game facilitates natural selection of cooperators.
We also use adaptive dynamics to study the coevolution of cooperation and
opting-out behavior. However, given rare mutations minutely different from
the original population, an analysis based on adaptive dynamics suggests
that the over time the population will tend towards complete defection and
non-participation, and subsequently, from there, participating cooperators
will stand a chance to emerge by neutral drift. Nevertheless, increasing the
probability of non-participation decreases the rate at which the population
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tends towards defection when participating. Our work sheds light on under-
standing how stochastic opting-out emerges in the first place and its role in
the evolution of cooperation.
Keywords: pairwise comparison, adaptive dynamics, finite populations,
social dilemmas, evolutionary dynamics
1. Introduction
Cooperation is everywhere. (See Axelrod (1984), Ho¨lldobler and Wilson
(2009), Traulsen and Nowak (2006), and Trivers (1971)). Bacteria cooper-
ate. For example, bacteria cooperate in biofilm production, where bacteria
go so far as to use quorum sensing to determine when there are enough co-
operators that contributing to the biofilm is worthwhile (Nadell 2008). Ants
cooperate, building vast anthills where members of a colony live together.
Birds cooperate, sounding an alarm when predators are nearby. Moreover,
humans cooperate. Indeed, whenever we contribute to a joint hunting effort,
bring food to a potluck, or work together to combat climate change, we are
cooperating. Why, though, do we see cooperation in all walks of life? How
does cooperation evolve? Researchers have dedicated significant effort in the
past twenty years towards studying the evolution of cooperation. (See An-
tal et al. (2009), Boyd et al. (2010), Hauert et al. (2002a), Hauert et al.
(2002b), Nowak (2006b), and Priklopil et al. (2017), as examples).
In particular, one common type of social interaction in which cooperation
frequently arises and which has recently attracted attention by researchers
is the public goods game (PGG). (See Hauert et al. (2002a), Hauert et al.
(2002b), and Pacheco et al. (2015)). In a public goods game, cooperators
contribute to a common pool which all participants of the game then share
equally. In fact, in all of the instances of cooperation mentioned in the pre-
ceding paragraph, organisms contribute to a public good. In the case of
bacteria, the public good is biofilm production. For ants, the good is the
anthill. For birds, the good is the knowledge that a predator is nearby and
hence that they should be careful. Lastly, for the party-goers, the good is
the food at the potluck.
However, whenever cooperators contribute to a common pool, there are free-
riders, who benefit from the common pool without contributing. Game the-
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orists frequently refer to such free-riders as defectors. These defectors cause
the participants of the game to receive a smaller share of the common pool–a
smaller payoff–than the social optimum where every player cooperates. In
fact, regardless of what each other player does, a defector always earns a
larger payoff because the defector does not have to contribute to the com-
mon pool, making defection the dominant strategy. Game theorists refer to
a situation in which the dominant strategy is not socially optimal as a social
dilemma. Consequentially, if each player were rational but unaware of the
strategies of the other players, each player would choose to defect, and each
player would receive no payoff.
In reality, even though in any particular PGG defectors will outperform co-
operators, averaging over all games, it may be the case that cooperators
actually outperform defectors. Such a situation is an example of Simpson’s
paradox (Hauert et al., 2002a). Additionally, there are many ways in which
a tweak to the PGG may promote cooperation (Battiston et al., 2017; Szol-
noki & Perc, 2015a,b). For instance, kin selection (Antal et al., 2009)(Nowak,
2006b), punishment of defectors (Boyd et al., 2010), signaling (Pacheco et
al. 2015), and optional participation (Hauert et al. (2002a) and Hauert et
al. (2002b)), and combinations of the preceding methods (Sigmund et al.
2010)(Hauert et al., 2008) have been used to promote cooperation. However,
in the literature, a small but realistic tweak to the public goods game has
yet to be addressed. Specifically, even if there is no punishment of defec-
tors or if players cannot opt-out, due to unforeseen circumstances, at times
players simply cannot participate in the PGG. For instance, an individual
traveling to a hunting party may come across a flooded road and be forced to
turn back. Or, an individual going to an international conference on climate
change may suddenly become too ill to travel. It is even possible that on a
whim, an individual may decide to engage in some activity other than the
game. As a result, players participate in the public goods game stochasti-
cally, unable to participate independently of whether or not the player plans
to cooperate or defect.
We investigate such public goods games with stochastic non-participation.
Ultimately, we add a fully analyzed stochastic model to the literature, im-
proving the understanding of the evolution of cooperation. Moreover, our
model demonstrates that a tweak even more slight than others in the current
literature, can facilitate cooperation. We conclude with an analysis of adap-
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tive dynamics for simplified 2 person PGGs in finite populations. In such an
analysis, we demonstrate that increasing the probability of non-participation
temporarily slows the rate at which the population tends to defection when
participating given rare mutations only minutely different from the original
population.
2. The Model
We consider a well-mixed finite population of n individuals, and suppose
that frequently N ≤ n randomly selected individuals receive the opportunity
to participate in a public goods game (PGG). In the PGG, individuals can
choose to cooperate, investing 1 unit into a common pool, as in Hauert et
al.(2002a) and Hauert et al. (2002b). Some force then multiplies the 1 unit
each cooperator invests by some factor N > r > 1 and thus for each unit
invested by a cooperator, the common pool increases by r units. At the end
of the game, each PGG participant obtains an equal share of the common
pool. However, the individuals who do not choose to cooperate choose to
defect, receiving a share from the common pool without contributing. To
simplify the model, we assume that individuals determine their strategies
before the PGG has begun, ignoring group composition, as in Hauert et al.
(2002a) and Hauert et al. (2002b).
As stated, the preceding model leads to domination by defectors for all games
where the multiplier r is smaller than the game size N and the game is thus
a social dilemma. To promote cooperation, we assume that due to unfore-
seen circumstances each player has a fixed probability α of being unable to
participate in the PGG, instead obtaining a fixed benefit or loss σ.
Furthermore, our model needs a method by which the population may change
its composition of players cooperating or defecting. We take pairwise com-
parison as such a method, where occasionally two individuals are randomly
selected. One individual will update his or her strategy by comparing his or
her success to the other individual. We let the probability p that the up-
dating individual adopts the strategy of the other individual be proportional
to the expected payoff difference between individuals of the two strategies.
Specifically, we let the probability of changing strategies be given by the
Fermi function, as in Traulsen (2007) and Pacheco (2015):
p = (1 + exp[−γ(picom − piup)])−1, (1)
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where picom represents the expected payoff of individuals playing the strategy
of the individual selected for comparison, piup represents the expected payoff
of individuals playing the strategy of the individual selected for updating,
and γ ≥ 0 represents a selection pressure, and corresponds to an inverse
temperature (Traulsen et al., 2007).
Figure 1: Model Schematic of Stochastic Opting-out. Cooperators (blue) and defectors
(red) are represented by dots. A fixed number of players are randomly drawn from the
population to participate in a PGG, represented by the small tan rectangular area. While
most players are able to make it to the game, some are not. Players then return to the
general populace, where no game is occurring.
When it comes to Adaptive Dynamics in finite populations, for simplicity,
we assume game size is 2. Furthermore, applying adaptive dynamics to the
problem as done in Imhof and Nowak (2010), we assume that a single mutant
who plays a strategy similar to that to the original population invades the
original population. Specifically, we suppose that every player plays a strat-
egy in the strategy space (β, α), where β is the probability that the player
cooperates if he or she plays, and α is the probability that due to unfore-
seen circumstances the player cannot play. We let the original population
be composed solely of players with strategy (β, α), and we suppose that the
population is invaded by a single player with strategy (β1, α1). Then, we let
β1 → β and α1 → α. As in Imhof and Nowak (2010), we also assume rare
mutation. That is, we assume sufficient time passes between mutations that
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either fixation, or extinction, of the mutant type occurs.
3. Results
3.1. Pairwise Invasion Based on Fixation Probability
To proceed with the analysis of the stochastic model, we must calculate
the expected payoffs for cooperators and defectors, pic and pid, respectively.
To calculate pid, we use the method presented by Hauert et al. (2002b). First,
we observe that in a game with S players, defectors receive a benefit rnc/S,
where nc is the number of cooperators in the game, if S > 1. However, if
S = 1, that player must be a loner, and will receive payoff σ. Then, noting
that any player does not play with probability α and plays with probability
1− α, and letting xc be the proportion of cooperators in the population,
pid = ασ + (1− α)[rxc[1− (1− αN)/(1− α)] + αN−1σ]. (2)
We defer the details to Appendix A. Employing a similar method,
pic = pid+r/(n−1)[α(1−αN−1)]+(1−α)[−1+(1−r)αN−1+(r/N)(1−αN)/(1−α)].
(3)
We defer the details to Appendix B. Hence,
pic−pid = r/(n−1)[α(1−αN−1)]+(1−α)[−1+(1−r)αN−1+(r/N)(1−αN)/(1−α)],
(4)
a constant. Then, inputting pic−pid into (1), the probability that a cooperator
becomes a defector given that a cooperator is selected for updating and a
defector is selected for comparison is
pcd = (1+exp[γ(r/(n−1)[α(1−αN−1)]+(1−α)[−1+(1−r)αN−1+(r/N)(1−αN)/(1−α)])])−1,
(5)
which is constant regardless of the number of cooperators. Thus the prob-
ability that the number of cooperators decreases by one in one iteration of
the pairwise comparison model is
pcdi(N − i)/[N(N − 1)]. (6)
Likewise, the probability that a defector becomes a cooperator given that the
defector is selected for updating and the cooperator is selected for comparison
is
pdc = (1+exp[−γ(r/(n−1)[α(1−αN−1)]+(1−α)[−1+(1−r)αN−1+(r/N)(1−αN)/(1−α)])])−1,
(7)
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also a constant. Hence, the probability that the number of cooperators in-
creases by one in one iteration of the pairwise comparison model is
pdci(N − i)/[N(N − 1)]. (8)
Of course, though, if the number of cooperators, i, is 0 or n, the probabilities
that a cooperator will change to a defector and that a defector will change
to a cooperator are both zero, and the number of cooperators remains at 0
or n. That is, i = 0 and i = n are absorption states in the model.
Moreover, now knowing pcd and pdc, and noting that pcd + pdc = 1, we can
calculate the transition matrix P for the Markov chain in which pairwise
selection is iterated repeatedly. However, as the transition matrix itself is
not vital for our analysis, we defer discussion of the transition matrix to Ap-
pendix C. On the other hand, the fixation probability of cooperation, that
is, the probability that given i cooperators in a population of defectors that
every individual will become a cooperator, is vital. Following the procedure
outlined by Nowak (2006a), we demonstrate that the fixation probability of
cooperation given i ≥ 1 cooperators, xi, is
xi = (1 + Σ
i−1
j=1Π
j
k=1pcd/pdc)/(1 + Σ
n−1
j=1Π
j
k=1pcd/pdc), (9)
where i = 1 implies the numerator is 1, where we denote pcd/pdc by
G(α, γ,N, n, r), and
G(α, γ,N, n, r) = (1 + exp(−γ(pic − pid)))/(1 + exp(γ(pic − pid))). (10)
Notably, G is constant over i. Hence, we may expand the numerator and
denominator of xi as geometric series. So, if G 6= 1,
xi = (1−Gi)/(1−Gn). (11)
However, G = 1 implies that pcd = pdc = 1/2, which implies neutral drift.
We assume for now that G 6= 1. Then, observing that pdc/pcd = G−1, the
fixation probability of defection given i defectors is simply xi with G replaced
by G−1:
yi = [G
n−i −Gn]/[1−Gn]. (12)
Hence, the fixation probability given i cooperators is
yn−i = [Gi −Gn]/[1−Gn]. (13)
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Thus, the probability of fixation of cooperators or defectors given i defectors
is
xi + yn−i = 1. (14)
Consequentially, the system always reaches an absorption state.
Furthermore, now knowing the probabilities of fixation of cooperation given
i cooperators, xi, and of defection given i defectors, yi, we can calculate
the strategy favored by natural selection. Moreover, as in Nowak (2006a),
natural selection favors cooperation over defection if and only if x1 > y1.
Likewise, natural selection favors defection over cooperation if and only if
y1 > x1 (Nowak, 2006a). Additionally, natural selection favors cooperation
over neutral drift if and only if x1 > 1/n = the probability of fixation given
natural drift (Nowak, 2006a). Likewise, natural selection favors defection
over neutral drift if and only if y1 > 1/n (Nowak, 2006a). In fact,
x1 > 1/n⇔ G < 1. (15)
We defer the proof to appendix D. Also, G = 1, implies neutral drift, since
G = 1 implies pcd = pdc = 1/2. Since G 6= 1 implies either pcd > pdc or
vice-versa, there is neutral drift if and only if G = 1. Thus, x1 < 1/n if and
only if G > 1. Hence, natural selection favors cooperation over neutral drift
if and only if G < 1, favors neither cooperation nor neutral drift one over the
other if and only if G = 1, and favors neutral drift over cooperation if and
only if G > 1. On the other hand,
G < 1⇒ y1 < 1/n, (16)
and
G > 1⇒ y1 > 1/n. (17)
We defer proofs of the two preceding assertions to Appendix D. Additionally
if G = 1, then there is neutral drift, as we demonstrated above, so y1 = 1/n.
Thus, if G > 1, y1 > 1/n > x1; if G = 1, then y1 = 1/n = x1; and otherwise,
i.e 0 < G < 1, y1 < 1/n < x1. Additionally, noting that if the model is not
experiencing neutral drift, then recalling that (1 + exp(−γ(pic − pid)))/(1 +
exp(γ(pic − pid))), clearly
G > 1⇔ pic − pid < 0. (18)
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Likewise,
G < 1⇔ pic − pid > 0. (19)
Also, G = 1 if and only if pic − pid = 0. Thus, there are three possibilities:
1) Natural selection favors cooperation over neutral drift, and neutral drift
over defection (pic − pid > 0), or
2) Natural selection favors neither cooperation nor neutral nor defection one
over the other, (pic − pid = 0), or
3) Natural selection favors defection over neutral drift, and neutral drift
over cooperation (pic − pid < 0).
Thus, the sign of pic−pid, a function of the probability that a given player opts
out α, the game size N , the population size n, and the return on investments
by cooperators, r, exclusively determines which strategies, cooperation or
defection, natural selection favors one over the another and whether or not
natural selection favors each strategy over neutral drift.
This has profound implications. Primarily, there exists a minimum value
of r, R, for given N and α such that r > R implies that pic − pid > 0,
r < R implies that pic − pid < 0, and r = R implies that pic − pid = 0. In-
deed, recalling that pic − pid = r/(n − 1)[α(1 − αN−1)] + (1 − α)[−1 + (1 −
r)αN−1+(r/N)(1−αN)/(1−α)], and noting that by the lemma in Appendix
D, [1−αN ]/[N(1−α)]−αN−1 > 0, and thus that [α(1−αN−1)]/[(n− 1)(1−
α)] + [1− αN ]/[N(1− α)]− αN−1 > 0, it follows that
pic − pid >0⇔ (20)
r >
1− αN−1
[α(1− αN−1)]/[(n− 1)(1− α)] + [1− αN ]/[N(1− α)]− αN−1 = R(α),
(21)
where R(α) is defined for [0,1). Simplifying,
R(α) = N
1− α− αN−1 + αN
1 + αN/(n− 1)− αN−1N + αN(N − 1−N/(n− 1)) , (22)
demonstrating that on [0,1), R is also the quotient of two polynomials of
degree N , and hence is continuous. By analogous proofs, pic − pid = 0 if and
9
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 2: Pairwise Invasion Dynamics in Finite Populations. Shown are graphs of fixation
probabilities for pic − pid > 0, as in (a) and (b), and for pic − pid, as in (c) and (d). If
pic−pid > 0, the fixation probability starting with one cooperator is always larger than the
same given neutral drift which is in turn always larger than that of one defector. On the
other hand, if pic− pid < 0, then the situation is reversed. That is, the fixation probability
starting with one defector is always larger than the same given neutral drift which is in
turn always larger than that of one cooperator. Notably, the graphs for pic − pid < 0, may
be obtained from the graphs for pic− pid > 0 simply by relabeling cooperators as defectors
and vice-versa. This is because reversing the sign of pic − pid is equivalent to inverting
pcd/pdc. Also, the values chosen for pic − pid are possible for the given values of n.
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only if r = R(α) and pic − pid < 0 if and only if r < R(α). Additionally, on
[0,1),
R(α) < N, (23)
(we defer the proof to Appendix D), so it is always possible to choose r such
that natural selection favors cooperation. Moreover, as proven in Appendix
E, R(α) is strictly decreasing on [0,1). Thus, given investment r = R, there
is a threshold α0 such that α > α0 implies natural selection favors coop-
eration. This threshold is analogous to the threshold on the proportion of
individuals who choose to opt-opt suggested by Hauert et al. (2002b), which
deals with an infinite rather than finite population and with planned rather
than unplanned non-participation. Moreover, this threshold is the value of
α satisfying r = R(α). Thus, as α increases, the requirements on r such
that natural selection favors cooperation become less and less stringent. In
other words, increasing the probability for players to be unable to participate
facilitates cooperation.
3.2. Adaptive Dynamics in Finite Populations
Considering that increasing the probability of non-participation facilitates
cooperation, it may be surprising that the adaptive dynamics for the two
player game discussed in The Model indicates that natural selection will push
individuals to always defect when participating or to never participate. To
see why, we consider a population consisting of two types of players, type one
and type two, defined by their strategies (β1, α1) and (β2, α2), respectively.
Otherwise maintaining the notation used in section 3.1, the expected payoff
for players of type 1 is
pi1 =
n− i
n− 1(1− α1)(1− α2)(rβ2/2 + rβ1/2− β1) +
i− 1
n− 1(1− α1)
2β1(r − 1)+
σα1 + σ(1− α1)( n− i
n− 1α2 +
i− 1
n− 1α1).
(24)
We defer the derivation of the expected payoff for players of type 1 to Ap-
pendix F. Moreover, since the game is symmetric, the expected payoff for
players of type 2 may be determined simply by replacing the number of play-
ers of type 1, i, with the number of players of type 2, n-i, and by switching
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subscripts. Specifically, the expected payoff for players of type 2 is
pi2 =
i
n− 1(1− α2)(1− α1)(rβ1/2 + rβ2/2− β2) +
n− i− 1
n− 1 (1− α2)
2β2(r − 1)+
σα2 + σ(1− α2)( i
n− 1α1 +
n− i− 1
n− 1 α2).
(25)
Continuing to use the pairwise comparison model, the probability that a
player of type 1 will adopt the strategy of a player of type 2 given that the
player of type 1 updates and the player of type 2 compares is
p1→2 = (1 + exp[−γ(pi2 − pi1)])−1, (26)
where γ is a selection pressure, just as in section 3.1. Similarly, the analogous
probability for players of type 2 is
p2→1 = (1 + exp[−γ(pi1 − pi2)])−1. (27)
Then, again following the method proposed by Nowak (2006a), the fixation
probability of a player of type 1 given i players of type 1 in a population of
players of type 2 is
xi = (1 + Σ
i−1
j=1Π
j
k=1p1→2/p2→1)/(1 + Σ
n−1
j=1Π
j
k=1p1→2/p2→1). (28)
For the remainder of this section, we will assume players of type 2 compose
the invaded population, and hence we will drop the subscripts on α2 and β2.
To investigate the adaptive dynamics, consider
~f(β, α) = lim(α1,β1)→(α,β)(∂x1/∂α1, ∂x1/∂β1).
The direction given by ~f for (α, β), plotting f as a vector field, is the direction
in the strategy space which maximizes the fixation probability of the invading
mutant population given one invading mutant, x1. Following the directions
which maximize x1 in the strategy space starting at an initial (α, β), that is,
following the streamlines of ~f , indicates the most likely path in the strategy
space that a population will take as mutants with similar strategies even-
tually fixate in the population, as suggested by Imhof and Nowak (2010).
Moreover, applying the StreamPlot function of Mathematica to the model
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for various combinations of r and σ in a population of size n indicates that
the probability an individual cooperates will decrease and that increasing r
or decreasing σ will facilitate participation. Notably, Mathematica demon-
strates that for γ = 1
lim
(α1,β1)→(α,β)
(∂x1/∂α1) = (α− 1)(n− 2)((r − 1)β − σ)/(2n), (29)
and
lim
(α1,β1)→(α,β)
(∂x1/∂β1) = (1− α)2(2− 2n− 2r + nr)/(4n). (30)
Unfortunately, the problem proves too complicated to calculate a closed-form
solution of ~f for every γ. Nevertheless, we conjecture that for any γ,
lim
(α1,β1)→(α,β)
(∂x1/∂α1) = (α− 1)γ(n− 2)((r − 1)β − σ)/(2n), (31)
and
lim
(α1,β1)→(α,β)
(∂x1/∂β1) = (1− α)2γ(2− 2n− 2r + nr)/(4n). (32)
(30) and (31) imply (28) and (29), respectively, and hold for a variety of
other test values of n, r, σ, and γ. In particular, (30) and (31) both hold if
β = 0.
Furthermore, if (31) is indeed true, then lim(α1,β1)→(α,β)(∂x1/∂β1) would be
independent of β and σ. Moreover, if n > 2, α2 < 1, γ > 0, and (31) is valid,
simple algebraic manipulation yields
lim
(α1,β1)→(α,β)
(∂x1/∂β1) > 0⇔ r > 1 + n/(n− 2) > 2. (33)
Likewise, lim(α1,β1)→(α,β)(∂x1/∂β1) = 0 if and only if r = 1 + n/(n− 2), and
lim(α1,β1)→(α,β)(∂x1/∂β1) < 0 if and only if r < 1 + n/(n− 2). On the other
hand, if γ = 0, or α2 = 1, then lim(α1,β1)→(α,β)(∂x1/∂β1) = 0, and if n = 2,
lim(α1,β1)→(α,β)(∂x1/∂β1) = (−1/4)(1− α)2γ. Hence, for all games which are
social dilemmas, i.e r < 2, and even for some games which are not social
dilemmas, the presence of rare and minute mutations leads each individual
towards defection when participating as long as α < 1 and γ > 0.
Moreover, if (31) holds, then cooperation is never stable if initially α 9 1,
and each individual in the population tends towards always defecting, i.e,
13
Figure 3: Coevolution of Cooperation and Stochastic Opting-out. Shown are the adaptive
dynamics using the stream plot function of Mathematica in a finite population of size n = 5
for selection strength γ = 1 and various values of return on investment, r, and payoff for
non-participants σ. Following the arrows leads to the most likely path the population will
take in the strategy space. Observe that as r increases or σ decreases the population tends
to participation at a faster rate or the population tends to non-participation at a slower
rate, where the rate is indicated by the slope of the arrows. Also, the population always
tends to defection when participating, and otherwise the population appears to tend to
non-participation. However, increasing α decreases the rate at which individuals in the
population tend to complete defection.
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β → 0. Thus, the sign of the right-hand-side of (30) becomes the sign of σ
when n > 2 and 0 otherwise, (although if n = 2 the right-hand side of (30) is
always 0). Hence, if σ < 0, each individual in the population tends towards
always defecting and always participating if (30) is valid. If σ = 0 or n = 0,
(30) and (31) demonstrate that defection with some degree of participation
is stable, but cooperation is not. Instead, if σ > 0, (30) and (31) show that
α → 1 anyways. On the other hand, if initially α → 1, α remains near 1
by (30) and (31). However, if α → 1, nobody participates (everyone gets
the same payoff σ) and thus neutral drift allows the establishment of coop-
eration along the edge α = 1. Also, if (31) is valid, increasing α increases
lim(α1,β1)→(α,β)(∂x1/∂β1), i.e increasing α decreases the rate at which individ-
uals in the population tend towards complete defection. Moreover, from Eq.
(31), we can obtain a possible rest point β∗ = σ/(r−1) on the edge of α = 1,
as long as the value of β∗ ∈ (0, 1). This can be confirmed in Fig. 3(b2) and
Fig. 3(c2).
4. Conclusion
Notably, for games where every player participates, i.e α = 0, the thresh-
old return on investment, R(0), above which natural selection favors coop-
eration is the game size, N . Hence, if the game size is reduced by a factor
(1 − α), where 0 < α < 1, the threshold value on investment is N(1 − α).
Moreover, if instead α is the probability that any given player does not par-
ticipate, the law of large numbers suggests that for very large game sizes,
the number of people participating in the game will be N(1 − α). If the
game size is very large but is small with respect to the population size, this
is exactly the threshold value R(α) for return on investment above which
natural selection favors cooperation. Hence, for very large games which are
small with respect to the population size, reducing α appears to be the sole
factor which facilitates cooperation.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 4: The shaded areas represent combinations of the multiplier r and probability of
non-participation α which promote cooperation for game size N = 5 and n = 10 in (a),
N = 500 and n = 1000 in (b), N = 5 and n = 100000000 in (c), and N = 500 and n =
100000000 in (d). The red line in each figure is the curveN(1−α). Note that in (b), R(α) ≈
N(1 − α)/(1 + 1/2α) < N(1 − α), whereas in (c), R ≈ N 1− α− α
N−1 + αN
1− αN−1N + αN (N − 1) >
N(1−α) for α > 0, which inequality may be obtained easily by noting that the denominator
is positive (see the lemma in Appendix D), multiplying both sides by the denominator,
and then applying simple algebraic manipulation. Also note that for n >> N >> 0 as in
(d), R ≈ N(1−α). The approximation in (c) is obtained easily by taking the appropriate
limits. The approximations in (b) and (d) are justified in Appendix G.
However, if population size and game size are both very large but population
size is no longer arbitrarily large with respect to game size, there is a second
factor at work. In the equation for the threshold, R(α), this second factor
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arises from the term ((n − 1)/N)α(1 − αN−1)/[1 − α]. This factor, always
positive, reduces the threshold R at every positive value of α, thereby facil-
itating cooperation. Furthermore, if the game size is small but population
size is still very large population, R → 2 as α → 1. Also considering that
R is strictly decreasing implies that the threshold curve R(α) also satisfies
R(α) > N(1−α) for large α, so there appears to be some other factor which
resists cooperation in small groups. Specifically, this factor occurs at least in
part because for 0 << α < 1, games become rare and the vast majority of
games become two player games, where natural selection favors cooperation
if and only if the return on investment by cooperators is larger than 2.
Despite increasing α always reducing the threshold value for cooperation,
the adaptive dynamics suggest that in the presence of minute and rare mu-
tations individuals in the population always tend towards always defecting
or never participating. Nevertheless, the adaptive dynamics also indicate
that the rate at which the population tends to defection is slower for larger
values of α. So, while assuming that players have a fixed probability of non-
participation in the adaptive dynamics does not make cooperation stable in
the presence of rare and minute mutations, by decreasing the rate at which
the population tends to defection, it essentially increases the time which the
population spends at higher levels of cooperation. Also, cooperation emerges
on the edge α = 1. Ultimately, either in the presence of rare and minute
mutations or not, assuming players are unable to participate with a fixed
probability facilitates cooperation.
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Appendix A. Derivation of pid
We define the probability that an event E occurs be denoted by P(E), and
let the probability that E occurs given a second event F occurs be denoted
by P (E|F ). Then,
pid =ασ + ΣP (nc ∩ S ∩ plays) ∗ payoff
=ασ + ΣP (plays)P (S|plays)P (nc|S ∩ plays) ∗ payoff
=ασ + (1− α)ΣP (S|plays)P (nc|S ∩ plays) ∗ payoff
=ασ + (1− α)[ΣNS=2P (S|plays)ΣS−1nc=0P (nc|S ∩ plays)rnc/S + P (S = 1|plays)σ]
=ασ + (1− α)[ΣNS=2P (S|plays)/SΣS−1nc=0P (nc|S ∩ plays)rnc + P (S = 1|plays)σ]
=ασ + (1− α)[rΣNS=2(1/S)
(
N − 1
S − 1
)
(1− α)S−1αN−SΣS−1nc=0
(
S − 1
nc
)
xncc ∗
(1− xc)S−1−ncnc + αN−1σ]
=ασ + (1− α)[rΣNS=2
(
N − 1
S − 1
)
(1− α)S−1αN−Sxc(S − 1)/SΣS−1nc=1
(
S − 2
nc − 1
)
xnc−1c ∗
(1− xc)S−1−nc + αN−1σ]
=ασ + (1− α)[rΣNS=2
(
N − 1
S − 1
)
(1− α)S−1αN−Sxc(S − 1)/SΣS−2k=0
(
S − 2
k
)
xkc∗
(1− xc)S−2−k + αN−1σ]
=ασ + (1− α)[rΣNS=2
(
N − 1
S − 1
)
(1− α)S−1αN−Sxc(S − 1)/S + αN−1σ]
=ασ + (1− α)[rxc(ΣNS=2
(
N − 1
S − 1
)
(1− α)S−1αN−S − ΣNS=2
(
N − 1
S − 1
)
(1− α)S−1∗
αN−S/S) + αN−1σ]
=ασ + (1− α)[rxc(ΣN−1k=1
(
N − 1
k
)
(1− α)kαN−k−1 − (1/N)ΣNS=2
(
N
S
)
(1− α)S−1∗
αN−S) + αN−1σ]
=ασ + (1− α)[rxc((1− αN−1)− 1/(N(1− α))ΣNS=2
(
N
S
)
(1− α)SαN−S) + αN−1σ]
=ασ + (1− α)[rxc((1− αN−1)− [1−N(1− α)αN−1 − αN ]/[N(1− α)] + αN−1σ]
=ασ + (1− α)[rxc(N −Nα− [1− αN ])/(N [1− α]) + αN−1σ]
=ασ + (1− α)[rxc[1− (1− αN)/(1− α)] + αN−1σ].
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We have verified via Mathematica and via Hauert et al. (2002b) that
ΣNS=2P (S|plays)ΣN−1nc=0P (nc|S ∩ plays)rnc/S + P (S = 1|plays)σ =
rxc[1− (1− αN)/(1− α)] + αN−1σ.
Appendix B. Derivation of pic
pic =ασ + ΣP (nc ∩ S ∩ plays) ∗ payoff
=ασ + (1− α)ΣP (S|plays)P (nc|S ∩ plays) ∗ payoff
=ασ + (1− α)[ΣNS=2P (S|plays)ΣS−1nc=0P (nc|S ∩ plays)((r/S)(nc + 1)− 1)+
P (S = 1|plays)σ]
=ασ + (1− α)[ΣNS=2P (S|plays)ΣS−1nc=0P (nc|S ∩ plays)rnc/S+
αN−1σ + ΣNS=2P (S|plays)ΣS−1nc=0P (nc|S ∩ plays)(r/S − 1)].
Noting that
ασ + (1− α)[ΣNS=2P (S|plays)ΣS−1nc=0P (nc|S ∩ plays)rnc/S + αN−1σ] = pid,
where xc is replaced by xc − 1/(n− 1), it follows that
pic =pid + r/(n− 1)[α(1− αN−1)] + (1− α)ΣNS=2P (S|plays)ΣS−1nc=0P (nc|S ∩ plays)∗
(r/S − 1)
=pid + r/(n− 1)[α(1− αN−1)] + (1− α)ΣNS=2P (S|plays)(r/S − 1)
=pid + r/(n− 1)[α(1− αN−1)] + (1− α)[rΣNS=2(1/S)
(
N − 1
S − 1
)
(1− α)S−1αN−S−
ΣNS=2
(
N − 1
S − 1
)
(1− α)S−1αN−S]
=pid + r/(n− 1)[α(1− αN−1)] + (1− α)[(r/N)ΣNS=2
(
N
S
)
(1− α)S−1αN−S−
ΣN−1k=1
(
N − 1
k
)
(1− α)kαN−k−1]
=pid + r/(n− 1)[α(1− αN−1)] + (1− α)[(r/[N(1− α)])ΣNS=2
(
N
S
)
(1− α)SαN−S−
(1− αN−1)]
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=pid + r/(n− 1)[α(1− αN−1)] + (1− α)[r/[N(1− α)](1−N(1− α)αN−1 − αN)−
1 + αN−1]
=pid + r/(n− 1)[α(1− αN−1)] + (1− α)[−1− rαN−1 + αN−1 + (r/N)(1− αN)/
(1− α)]
=pid + r/(n− 1)[α(1− αN−1)] + (1− α)[−1 + (1− r)αN−1 + (r/N)(1− αN)/
(1− α)].
Again, we have verified via Mathematica and via Hauert et al. (2002b) that
ΣNS=2P (S|plays)ΣS−1nc=0P (nc|S ∩ plays)(r/S − 1) =
− 1 + (1− r)αN−1 + (r/N)(1− αN)/(1− α).
Appendix C. Transition Matrix
We define P be the transition matrix for the Markov chain formed by
repeatedly iterating pairwise comparison. Then, Pi,i−1 = pcdi(n − i)/[n(n −
1)], and Pi,i+1 = pdci(n − i)/[n(n − 1)], for i=2, 3, ..., n-1. Since the only
other transition from i cooperators per iteration is the absence of transition,
Pi,i = 1 − Pi,i−1 − Pi,i+1, and the remaining entries in the ith row are 0.
Also considering that i = 0 cooperators and i = n cooperators are absorbing
states, it follows that P is the tridiagonal (n+1)x(n+1) matrix
1 0 0 0 . . . 0
P2,1 P2,2 P2,3 0 . . . 0
0 P3,2 P3,3 P3,4
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . . . . . 0
0 . . . 0 Pn−1,n−2 Pn−1,n−1 Pn−1,n
0 . . . 0 0 0 1

.
Fortunately, the calculation P k as k → ∞ is relatively straightforward. In-
deed, the calculated the fixation probabilities xi in (11), and yn−i in (13),
represent, respectively, the last and first entries in the ith row of limn→∞ P n.
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Also considering that the entries in any given row of P n must sum to 1 as
P n is a stochastic matrix, and that xi + yn−i = 1, it follows that
lim
n→∞
P n =

1 0 . . . 0 0
x1 0 . . . 0 yn−1
x2 0 . . . 0 yn−2
...
...
...
...
...
xn−1 0 . . . 0 y1
0 0 . . . 0 1

.
Thus, limn→∞XP n converges to a vector of the form (a, 0, ..., 0, b). Namely,
the set of vectors of the form (a, 0, ..., 0, b) is the set of eigenvectors of
limn→∞ P n, which in turn is the set of eigenvectors of P with eigenvalue
1. Moreover, if X = (Prob(i = 0), P rob(i = 1), ..., P rob(i = n)), then
limn→∞XP n converges to a vector of the form (α, 0, ..., 0, β), where α+β = 1.
Since the set of vectors of the form (α, 0, ..., 0, β) with α + β = 1 is the set
of stochastic eigenvectors of P with eigenvalue 1, it follows that depending
on the initial probability vector for the system, X = (Prob(i = 0), P rob(i =
1), ..., P rob(i = n)), the system can potentially converge to any stochastic
eigenvector.
Appendix D. Inequalities
Appendix D.1. Proof of (15)
x1 > 1/n⇔ (D.1)
[1−G]/[1−Gn] > 1/n⇔ (D.2)
[1−Gn]/[1−G] < n⇔ (D.3)
Σn−1k=0G
k < Σn−1k=01⇔ (D.4)
G < 1. (D.5)
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Appendix D.2. Proof of (16)
y1 < 1/n⇔ (D.6)
[Gn−1 −Gn]/[1−Gn] < 1/n⇔ (D.7)
[1−G]/[1−Gn] < 1/(nGn−1)⇔ (D.8)
[1−Gn]/[1−G] > nGn−1 ⇔ (D.9)
(1/n)Σn−1k=0G
k > Gn−1 ⇔ (D.10)
(1/n)Σn−1k=0G
k > (G(n−1)(n)/2)2/n ⇔ (D.11)
(1/n)Σn−1k=0G
k > ((Πn−1k=0G
k)1/n)2. (D.12)
Moreover, if G < 1, then (Πn−1k=0G
k)
1
n > ((Πn−1k=0G
k)
1
n )2. Hence, if G < 1,
applying the arithmetic-mean-geometric-mean (AM-GM) inequality demon-
strates that
(1/n)Σn−1k=0G
k > ((Πn−1k=0G
k)1/n)2. (D.13)
Thus, G < 1 implies that y1 < 1/n. 
Appendix D.3. Proof of (17)
If G > 1 and n > 1, note that
y1 > 1/n⇔ (D.14)
[Gn−1 −Gn]/[1−Gn] > 1/n⇔ (D.15)
G− 1
G− 1/Gn−1 > 1/n⇔ (D.16)
G−G1−n < nG− n. (D.17)
Then, observe that
d2
d2G
(G−G1−n) = −n(n− 1)G−n−1 < 0, (D.18)
for n > 1. Thus,
d
dG
(G−G1−n) = 1− (1− n)G−n (D.19)
is decreasing whereas
d
dG
(nG− n) = n (D.20)
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is constant. Also considering that
d
dG
(G−G1−n)|G→1 = n = d
dG
(nG− n)|G→1, (D.21)
it follows that
d
dG
(G−G1−n) < d
dG
(nG− n), (D.22)
for n > 1. Since it is also true that as G→ 1, G−Gn−1 → 0 and nG−n→ 0,
G−G1−n < nG− n. (D.23)
Therefore, if G > 1, y1 > 1/N . 
Appendix D.4. Lemma: 1− αN−1N + αN(N − 1) > 0
For α = 0, 1− αN−1N + αN(N − 1) = 1. Then, if α ∈ (0, 1) and N > 1,
1− αN−1N + αN(N − 1) >0⇔ (D.24)
[1− αN ]/[N(1− α)]− αN−1 >0⇔ (D.25)
(1/N)(ΣN−1k=0 α
k)− αN−1 >0⇔ (D.26)
(1/N)(ΣN−1k=0 α
k) >(α(N−1)N/2)
2
N ⇔ (D.27)
(1/N)(ΣN−1k=0 α
k) >((ΠN−1k=0 α
k)1/N)2. (D.28)
However, since ((ΠN−1k=0 α
k)1/N)2 = αN−1 < 1,
((ΠN−1k=0 α
k)1/N)2 < ((ΠN−1k=0 α
k)1/N), (D.29)
and since by the AM-GM inequality,
(1/N)(Σk=N−1k=0 α
k) > ((ΠN−1k=0 α
k)1/N) (D.30)
D.28 must be valid. .
Appendix D.5. Proof of (22)
If N > 1,
N >
1− αN−1
[1− αN ]/[N(1− α)]− αN−1 ⇔ (D.31)
[1− αN ]/[1− α]−NαN−1 > 1− αN−1 ⇔ (D.32)
ΣN−1k=0 α
k − (N − 1)αN−1 > 1⇔ (D.33)
(1/(N − 1))ΣN−1k=1 αk > αN−1. (D.34)
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However, by the AM-GM inequality,
(1/(N − 1))ΣN−1k=1 αk >
√
αN . (D.35)
D.32 is true if and only if the denominator of D.31 is positive. This is true
by the lemma. Also considering that 0 < α < 1, and so for N > 2
1 >αN−2 ⇒ (D.36)
αN >α2N−2 ⇒ (D.37)√
αN >αN−1, (D.38)
it follows that (D.34) is always true. Since,
[α/(n− 1)][1− αN−1]/[1− α] = α/(n− 1)ΣN−2k=0 αk > 0 (D.39)
for α ∈ (0, 1) and N ≥ 2,
1− αN−1
[1− αN ]/[N(1− α)]− αN−1 > R(α). (D.40)
Therefore, N > R for N > 2. However, if N = 2,
1− αN−1
[1− αN ]/[N(1− α)]− αN−1 = 2. (D.41)
Applying (D.40) to (D.41), for α ∈ (0, 1) and N ≥ 2, N > R(α). 
Appendix D.6. Proof that as n/N → 0, R(α) > N(1− α)
As n/N → 0, R(α)→ N 1− α− α
N−1 + αN
1− αN−1N + αN(N − 1). Hence,
N(1− α) <N 1− α− α
N−1 + αN
1− αN−1N + αN(N − 1) ⇔ (D.42)
(1− α)(1− αN−1N + αN(N − 1)) <1− α− αN−1 + αN ⇔ (D.43)
1− αN−1N + αN(N − 1) <1− αN−1 ⇔ (D.44)
αN(N − 1) <αN−1(N − 1)⇔ (D.45)
αN < αN−1, (D.46)
which is true for α ∈ (0, 1). D.43 holds if and only if the denominator of the
right-hand-side of D.42 is positive. This is true by the lemma. 
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Appendix E. Proof that R(α) Is Strictly Decreasing on [0, 1)
Let
F (α) = r([1− αN ]/[N(1− α)]− αN−1)− (1− αN−1). (E.1)
As shown in Hauert et al. (2002b), F on (0, 1) has no root for r ≤ 2. The
preceding result does not hold, though, if N = 2. We address the case for
which N = 2 at the end of the following proof. For now, we suppose N > 2.
Then, for every r > 2 there exists exactly one α such that F = 0. We
consider
Q(α) =
1− αN−1
[1− αN ]/[N(1− α)]− αN−1 . (E.2)
Q gives the values of r given α for which F is zero. Hence, Q is injective
where it is defined. Since [1− αN ]/[N(1− α)]− αN−1 is positive on [0, 1) by
the lemma in Appendix D, Q is defined and thus injective on (0,1). Thus, Q
is either strictly decreasing or strictly increasing on (0,1). However,
lim
α→0
Q(α) = N, (E.3)
and
lim
α→1
Q(α) = 2, (E.4)
applying l’Hoˆpital’s rule twice. Since Q is continuous on (0,1) there exist
δ1 < 1/2 and δ2 < 1/2 such that for α ∈ (0, 0 + δ1) and for α ∈ (1 − δ2, 1),
|Q(α) − N | < 1/3 and |Q(α) − 2| < 1/3, respectively. Choosing arbitrary
c1 ∈ (0, 0 + δ1) and c2 ∈ (1− δ2, 1), it follows that for N > 2, Q(c1) > Q(c2)
and c1 < c2. Hence, Q must be strictly decreasing on (0, 1). Moreover,
Q(0) = N . Also considering that Q < N on (0, 1), as shown in the proof of
(22), Q is strictly decreasing on [0, 1). Then, we let the numerator of Q be
S(α) = 1− αN−1, (E.5)
and note that S is strictly decreasing but positive on [0, 1). Next, we let the
denominator of Q be
T (α) = [1− αN ]/[N(1− α)]− αN−1, (E.6)
which is positive in [0,1) by the lemma in Appendix D. Lastly we let
U(α) = [α/(n− 1)][1− αN−1]/[1− α], (E.7)
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which is non-negative on [0,1) since it is the product of three non-negative
terms. Also, [1 − αN−1]/[1 − α] = ΣN−2k=0 αk for N ≥ 2, a strictly increasing
function of α for α ≥ 0 if N > 2 and constant if N = 2. Since α/(n − 1) is
strictly increasing, it follows that U(α) is also strictly increasing on [0,∞)
for N ≥ 2. Next, note that
R(α) = S(α)/[T (α) + U(α)], (E.8)
and consider any α1, α2 ∈ [0, 1) such that α1 < α2. Then,
R(α1) > R(α2)⇔ (E.9)
S(α1)/[T (α1) + U(α1)] > S(α2)/[T (α2) + U(α2)]⇔ (E.10)
S(α1)T (α2) + S(α1)U(α2) > S(α2)T (α1) + S(α2)U(α1). (E.11)
However, since S is strictly decreasing, S(α1) > S(α2). Also considering that
since U is strictly increasing, U(α2) > U(α1), and that S is positive and U
is non-negative with a zero only at α = 0, it follows that
S(α1)U(α2) > S(α2)U(α1). (E.12)
Furthermore, since Q is strictly decreasing and T is positive,
S(α1)T (α2) > S(α2)T (α1). (E.13)
(E.12) and (E.13) together imply that E.11 is valid. Thus, R is strictly
decreasing on [0, 1) for N > 2. However, if N = 2, then the only change from
the above proof is that Q is constant rather than strictly decreasing. Then,
(E.12) still holds, and we replace (E.13) by
S(α1)T (α2) = S(α2)T (α1). (E.14)
Thus, (E.11) still holds. Hence, R is strictly decreasing on [0, 1) for N ≥ 2.

Appendix F. Derivation of pi1 (equation 24)
The payoff matrix for a two person public goods game in which coop-
erators invest 1 unit which is then multiplied by r and distributed equally
among all players is
c d
c r − 1 r/2− 1
d r/2 0
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Then, we suppose that there are i players of type 1 in a population of n
individuals, and that the remaining individuals are of type 2. We let a player
of type 1 be one of the players invited to play in the two person PGG and call
that player ”player A”. Next, we let Ac, Ad, An, and A
c
n represent the events
where player A cooperates, defects, does not participate, and participates,
respectively. We suppose ”player B” is the other individual invited to play.
We let Bc, Bd, Bn be the events where player B cooperates, defects, and does
not participate, respectively. Lastly, we let E1 and E2 be the events where
Player B is of type 1 and of type 2, respectively. Denoting the intersection of
any two events F and G by FG, and the probability that an event F occurs
by p(F),
pi1 =(r − 1)[p(AcE1Bc) + p(AcE2Bc)] + (r/2− 1)[p(AcE1Bd) + p(AcE2Bd)]
+ r/2[p(AdE1Bc) + p(AdE2Bc)] + σ[p(An) + p(A
c
nE1Bn) + p(A
c
nE2Bn)]
=(r − 1)[p(Ac)p(E1|Ac)p(Bc|AcE1) + p(Ac)p(E2|Ac)p(Bc|AcE2)]
+ (r/2− 1)[p(Ac)p(E1|Ac)p(Bd|AcE1) + p(Ac)p(E2|Ac)p(Bd|AcE2)]
+ r/2[p(Ad)p(E1|Ad)p(Bc|AdE1) + p(Ad)p(E2|Ad)p(Bc|AdE2)]
+ σ[p(An) + p(A
c
n)p(E1|Acn)p(Bn|AcnE1) + p(Acn)p(E2|Acn)p(Bn|AcnE2)]
=(r − 1)β1(1− α1)[p(E1|Ac)β1(1− α1) + p(E2|Ac)β2(1− α2)]
+ (r/2− 1)β1(1− α1)[p(E1|Ac)(1− β1)(1− α1) + p(E2|Ac)(1− β2)(1− α2)]
+ r/2(1− β1)(1− α1)[p(E1|Ad)β1(1− α1) + p(E2|Ad)β2(1− α2)]
+ σ[α1 + (1− α1)[p(E1|Acn)α1 + p(E2|Acn)α2]
=(r − 1)β1(1− α1)[ i− 1
n− 1β1(1− α1) +
n− i
n− 1β2(1− α2)]
+ (r/2− 1)β1(1− α1)[ i− 1
n− 1(1− β1)(1− α1) +
n− i
n− 1(1− β2)(1− α2)]
+ r/2(1− β1)(1− α1)[ i− 1
n− 1β1(1− α1) +
n− i
n− 1β2(1− α2)]
+ σ[α1 + (1− α1)[ i− 1
n− 1α1 +
n− i
n− 1α2]
=
n− i
n− 1(1− α1)(1− α2)(rβ2/2 + rβ1/2− β1) +
i− 1
n− 1(1− α1)
2β1(r − 1)
+ σα1 + σ(1− α1)( n− i
n− 1α2 +
i− 1
n− 1α1)
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Appendix G. Justification of Approximations
Appendix G.1. Approximation for R(α) as N →∞, N
n− 1 = c
We let c be a real number in [0,1]. As N → ∞, αN−1N , αN(N − 1 −
N/(n− 1)), αN−1, and αN → 0 as long as α9 1. Hence, for α9 1,
R(α) =N
1− α− αN−1 + αN
1 + αN/(n− 1)− αN−1N + αN(N − 1−N/(n− 1))
≈N(1− α)/(1 + cα).
However, applying l’Hoˆpital’s rule yields limα→1R(α) = 0, which is limα→1N(1−
α)/(1 + 1/2α). 
Appendix G.2. Approximation for R(α) for n >> N >> 0
As n→∞, N →∞, N/n→ 0, for alpha9 1,
R(α) =N
1− α− αN−1 + αN
1 + αN/(n− 1)− αN−1N + αN(N − 1−N/(n− 1))
≈N(1− α).
However, as in the preceding proof, applying l’Hoˆpital’s rule yields limα→1R(α) =
0, which is limα→1N(1− α). 
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